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This paper employs a gravity equation to estimate the effects of economic freedom on U.S. consumer exports 
and imports for 131 countries over the years 2000 - 2005. Using the newly updated Fraser Institute's Economic 
Freedom of the World Index, we find that increased economic freedom in the rest of the world would increase 
the United States' overall trade volume. We also consider whether imports and exports are affected 
asymmetrically with respect to income, transaction costs, and economic freedom. We find considerable 
differences in how these variables affect imports and exports of consumer goods. Our results also give some 
insight into how economic freedom might affect the U.S. trade position. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The literature on the effects of economic freedom on the welfare of an economy's participants has 
been growing in recent years, though the concept is considerably older. Authors such as Peter Bauer and 
Friedrich von Hayek, among others 1 argue that the centralized coordination of individual and group action 
would find it impossible to reach an outcome superior to that which would obtain with private action and 
information. The upshot of these authors' works was that a necessary condition for sustained economic 
growth and activity was some minimum level of individual freedom, especially in the allocation of scarce 
resources, i.e., economic freedom. 
 With the arrival of larger and more comprehensive data sets, as well as indices of freedom, such as 
the Heritage Foundation's Freedom Index and the Simon Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World 
Index have made it possible to enlarge studies of the impacts of various components of freedom on 
economic activity. 
Most studies on the impacts of freedom on welfare have been conducted the role of economic 
freedom on economic growth literature with the consensus being that several elements of economic 
freedom enhance economic performance at the macro level (e.g. Barro, 1991 Easton and Walker, 1997, de 
Haan and Sturm, 2000, and Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright, 2001).2 Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that freedom “Granger Causes” income (Farr, Lord,and Wolfenbarger, 1998). 
However, there a numerous studies which use freedom as an explanatory variable in a variety of 
contexts. Klein and Luu (2003) show that freer countries tend to be more efficient therefore producing 
closer to their PPF because they are more likely to recognize their true comparative advantage in a global 
market. 
Studying the impacts of freedom on intellectual property rights, Depken and Simmons (2004) 
demonstrate greater protection of intellectual property thus providing a greater incentive to innovate, with 
commensurate public good aspects of new ideas. Similarly, Ovaska and Sobel (2005) and Clark and Lee 
(2006) demonstrate that economic free countries are better suited for entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Though freedom correlates with more failures and successes, it is these dynamics which allow an economy 
to diversify the possible sources of (successful) innovation. On the other hand, with less freedom comes 
greater concentration of innovation within a “ruling elite” which may not be necessarily a better solution. 
Depken, La Fountain and Butters (2007) demonstrate that higher corruption reduces returns in the 
formal sector and rewards economic activity in the informal sector and potentially reducing overall 
economic activity. The rent seeking behavior of corrupt officials lead to inefficient government projects 
and aid, difficulties in creating/maintaining infrastructure (public health issues). 
                                                                          
1 See, for example Peter Bauer's collected essays in From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays, and Hayek's 
comments about information (1937 and 1989). 
2 Freedom indicators include: corruption, market capitalization, independent monetary authority, civil war, property 
rights, etc. See the Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), a special issue on growth, for a good overview. 
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Likewise, the impacts of financial institutions on economic welfare (see Leopold, 2006) show that 
liberalization of asset markets positively impacts economic welfare gains. 
This paper extends a paper of the effects of economic freedom on trade flows between the United 
States and her trading partners by Depken and Sonora (2005), but it also expands it in two notable ways. 
First, in their paper, they only employed an overall index of economic freedom whereas the current paper 
uses disaggregated freedom indicators such as the independent use of fiscal and monetary policy, 
restrictions on international flows of goods and services and capital flows, to name a couple. Secondly, the 
paper takes advantage of the expanded data set available from the Fraser Institute. Depken and Sonora only 
had two years of up-to-date data which has been expanded to six years allowing us to examine trade 
dynamics. 
Breaking the index into its component parts allows us to investigate which elements which make 
up freedom, from economic policy to regulation to institutions, have the greatest impact, if any, on the trade 
of final goods and services between the US and its trading partners. Obvious institutional restrictions on 
trade, tariffs, quotas, subsidies, etc., should have a deleterious effect on trade, but are there other factors 
which undermine, or augment, trade. 
Following Summary (1989), and Depken and Sonora (2005) this paper also reconsiders the 
standard gravity model which implicitly assumes that impacts of independent variables are symmetric on 
exports, imports, and the total volume of trade. 
Empirically, I find that the economic freedom of a trading partner is found to have a statistically 
significant and positive effect on the volume of trade between the U.S. and its trading partners. Moreover, 
there is considerable evidence that trade flows do respond asymmetrically. Generally, there is greater 
evidence that export elasticities are larger than import and total volume elasticities. 
I also find the economic sub-indices to generally be good indicators of trade flows, though two 
components do not have much predictive power. Interestingly, the component which rates the freedom of 
judiciary and preservation of property rights has little predictive power, or is negatively related to trade 
flows. 
Next, I analyze the effects of changes in the relevant variables change trading partners over various 
time frames. I find changes in Real GDP and population have a more pronounced effect on trade flows over 
the shorter term whereas freedom effect trade over the medium term. Similarly, I employ an ordered probit 
model to investigate probability of increased trade based on changes in freedom and output. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 briefly outlines the theoretic justification for using the gravity 
framework and presents the gravity framework employed here; Section 2 examines the data used and some 
descriptive statistics; Section 3 provides empirical analysis of the effects of economic freedom on US 
imports and exports; provides discussion of our results and presents estimates of the gains from economic 
freedom; concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are offered in the final section. 
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2. The Gravity Model 
 
 The gravity model's basic premise is that the volume of trade is determined by the income of any 
two countries and that higher income countries are `drawn' towards each other by the gravitational pull of 
their respective GDPs. It was introduced into the international trade literature by Tinbergen (1962) and 
Pöynöhen (1963) but has long been used in the social sciences to describe migration, shipping, tourism, etc. 
In its simplest form the volume of trade between any two countries is an increasing function of their 
incomes and a decreasing function of the distance between them, often interpreted as the transportation, or 
`iceberg', cost of moving goods between the countries. 
The standard (logarithmic) gravity representation is given by  
   εγαααααα +++++++ ∑ kk
k
jijiji zpoppopyydistvol 543210, =                                  (1) 
where the α 's and γ  are coefficients to be estimated, and ε  is a normally distributed error term. The 
dependent variable, ijvol , is the volume of trade between countries i  and j . The independent variables 
include the GDP of each of the trading countries, iy  and jy , the distance between the two countries, ijdist , 
the population of each country, ipop  and jpop , and a vector of other variables z .
3 Lower case variables 
represent natural logs. Usually, the parameters of interest are 1α , the elasticity of trade volume with respect 
to distance, and the countries' GDP, 2α  and 3α . Generally, the literature finds estimates of these 
parameters to be: 0.6]1.2,[ˆ1 −−∈α , [0.5,1.1]ˆ2 ∈α , and [0.4,0.8]ˆ3 ∈α , see Wall (1999 and 2000) Wolf (2000), 
and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002). 
Another interesting development is the use of gravity models to estimate the effects of international 
borders on trade flows, that is, to find the `distance equivalents' of borders in terms of miles.4 
Though the gravity model has been widely adopted because of its empirical success, e.g., high 2R s 
and tight fits of parameter estimates, there lacked any serious rigorous theoretical justification. Anderson 
(1979) and Bergstrand (1985) derived gravity equations from trade models of product differentiation and 
increasing returns to scale. Additionally, Anderson (1985) shows how including variables such as tariffs in 
z  is consistent with established theory. 
Evenett and Keller (1998) successfully incorporate the gravity model within the Ricardian and 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson frameworks. Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2001) show that a version of the 
gravity model is consistent with new theories of international trade including: models of transportation 
costs; monopolistic competition and national product differentiation (expenditure function based); 
homogeneous products (intra-industry) trade; and an amalgam of imperfect competition, segmented 
                                                                          
3 For example: dummies for border countries, membership in trade agreements and diversion (Soloaga and Winters, 
2001), intra-state or intra-national trade (Wolf, 2000), directional flows of trade (Wall 2000), and terrorism (Blomberg 
and Hess, 2006). 
4 See McCallum (1995), Engel and Rogers (1996), Wall (2000), and Anderson and among others. 
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markets models, and `reciprocal dumping'. More recently Anderson and Wincoop (2004) demonstrate that 
gravity can link cross country general equilibrium models to barriers of trade. Moreover, they show that 
trade costs do not necessarily depend on the structure of the general equilibrium that underlies consumption 
and production allocation. 
Note that this model considers bilateral exchanges between all countries in the sample and cannot 
extract differences in export and import patterns as one countries exports are, of course, an others imports. 
Thus, in equation (1) we cannot examine trade asymmetries that may exist between exports and imports. To 
analyze differences in trade patters, we must rely on a single country gravity model, first used by Summary 
(1989) using US data for the years 1978 and 1982. Her estimates show that trade asymmetries do exist 
between the two key variables, real GDP and distance, and the endogenous variables, exports and imports. 
Similarly, Depken and Sonora (2005) also find evidence for asymmetries in the treatment of exports and 
imports  and total volume trade. 
This paper employs a gravity model of the form analyzed in Summary (1989) and Depken and 
Sonora (2005). The model used here is given by  
              ,= 43210 εβββββ +++++ iiiii efwipopydistv                                                 (2) 
where the dependent variable, iv , is alternatively the total volume of consumer-goods trade (TV ), exports 
( EXP ), and imports ( IMP ) between the U.S. and country i , efwi  is economic freedom and all other 
variables are discussed above. Two diversion/creation dummies, one each for OECD and NAFTA countries 
are also included.Of most interest are the sign and significance of 21, ββ  and 4β . As in the standard gravity 
model we anticipate that greater distance between trading partners reduces the volume of trade, i.e., 0<ˆ1β . 
It is expected that countries with greater levels of income and population trade more with the U.S.,  ceteris 
paribus, i.e., 0>0,> 32 ββ , though there is no consistent, or theoretical, reason why 3β  should be positive. 
Indeed, one might expect that relative, say to GDP, more populous countries are lower income and thus, 
would tend to trade less with the US, more on this below.  Ex ante we might expect economic freedom 
implies a greater degree of access to foreign markets, therefore, 0>ˆ4β . 
The specification in equation ((2)) is closest in spirit to Wall (1999) and Anderson and Marcouiller 
(2002). Wall investigates the welfare implications of trade openness and economic freedom by using the 
Heritage Foundation's index of trade policy and Anderson and Marcouiller investigate the effects of a 
vector of “obstacles to doing business” such as high taxes, institutions (regulations, corruption, crime, labor 
regulations, inflation, etc.) In each case, as anticipated, impediments to a well-functioning economy reduce 
trade flows whether they be  a la carte or compiled in a single index. Here, the EFWI incorporates trade 
policy, “obstacles to doing business,” and other policies that make it relatively more or less difficult to 
engage in trade in consumer goods. The extension of the gravity model employed here follows in the spirit 
of the aforementioned authors. 
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Using of total volume of trade implicitly assumes that the the impacts of distance, national income, 
and economic freedom are symmetric on both imports and exports. Yet, this restriction is rarely discussed 
much less explicitly tested. However, it is likely that distance would have a greater impact on U.S. exports 
to than on U.S. imports from the same country. Because imports and exports face asymmetric policies and 
attitudes about traded goods, the estimated coefficient for the Freedom Index will likely differ for imports 
and exports. 
Because presumably the impacts of changes on trade are not immediate, it should take time for 
changes to real GDP and freedom to have an impact on trade flows, we investigate changes in freedom over 
a five year time horizon. Therefore, I also consider equation (2) in growth terms:  
 ,= ,4,3,210, iktiktiktiikti efwipopgdpdistv εβββββ +∆+∆+∆++∆ −−−−                           (3) 
with 51,= Kk .  
 
 
3. The Data  
 
 The data used is the value of  consumer imports and exports between the U.S. between 120 and 137 
countries for the years 2000 -- 2005. The number of countries differs across years as data for some 
countries became available (e.g. Vietnam and several Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]).5 Note, 
this is not a complete set of all countries listed in the United Nations, but represents the majority of US 
trading partners. I concentrate on consumer goods as it is the consumption of household, final, goods and 
services which contribute to overall economic welfare, an outward shift in the “consumption possibilities 
frontier” (CPF), this is similar in spirit to the shift in the PPF discussed by Klein and Luu (2003). Similarly, 
exports represent increases in the overall output in a country which concurrently expands the PPF. 
It is true that capital goods constitute a large portion of trade, but they typically have only an 
indirect influence on the welfare or utility of the consumers of the trading partner. A benefit of economic 
freedom is the increased set of consumer goods and services. Moreover, many countries, any form of 
reduced economic freedom does not attenuate the ability to import capital goods from the U.S. or to export 
consumer goods to the U.S. Secondly, many of the limitations on exports from the United States are in the 
capital good sector, e.g., computer technology, satellite systems, etc. 
These years are used because of data constraints, discussed below. The country specific import and 
export data is from the USA Trade Online data sponsored by the U.S. Census Bureau. Individual country 
GDP and population data for each year comes from the IMF's IFS macroeconomic data set. Distance is the 
greater surface distance between the (log) center of the United States, roughly Chicago, IL, and the 
individual trading partner's capital (e.g. Paris, France). All data for trade and real GDP is in billions of 
dollars, population is in millions. 
                                                                          
5 For details on the countries in the sample please contact the author. 
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For economic freedom I use the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFWI) calculated by the 
Fraser Institute. Other research in the effects of economic freedom, such as Wall (1999), have used the 
freedom index calculated by the Heritage Foundation (HFI). Both indices are calculated by using a 
weighted average of several different components of economic freedom. However there are some 
differences between the two indices (a more detailed explanation is provided in de Haan and Sturm, 2000). 
First, the EFWI relies primarily on  quantitative variables while the HFI uses  qualitative evaluations to sort 
countries into one of five categories, assigned one-to-five component ratings. While the [0,5]∈HFI  with 0 
the most free, the (0,10]∈EFWI , with 10 being the `most free', see Gwartney and Lawson (2007) for 
details.6 Recently, the Fraser Institute updated its methodology for calculating the freedom index for 
consecutive years and, to date, this version of the data is only available for the period 2000 -- 2005 --- 
herein lies the data restriction mentioned above. Figure 2 shows the percentage difference from the mean 
for each country for 2005. 
In addition to the overall index, the paper also examines the the sub-freedom indices. They are:  
AREA 1, the Size of Government;  AREA 2, Legal System and Property Rights;  AREA 3, “Sound Money”;  
AREA 4, is divided into an  international trade component (AREA 4a and a freedom of  international 
capital movement component (AREA 4b);  AREA 5a, Business Regulation; and  AREA 5b, is overall 
Regulation. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, for each year and overall for Distance, Imports, 
Exports, Total Volume, Real GDP, and Population -- all of these are natural logs. The percent change 
calculated for the entire period is the average of the growth over the sample period. Table 2 contains simple 
sample correlations over the entire period for the trade variables, freedom, distance and real GDP. Figure 1 
shows the overall freedom index and each of the individual freedom Area Index means and the standard 
deviations -- this data is  not in logs. For comparison, the US indices are also included, the sample mean 
and standard deviations do not include the US data. 
Turning our attention first to the freedom indices in Figure 1 we note that the general trend for the means is 
upwards (more freedom) with the exception of the international trade flows of goods and services and capital. 
Both are falling, about 0.5 points for each, however it is also worth noting that there is less freedom in capital 
movements than in trade, which is intuitively attractive given the ongoing trade negotiations reducing trade 
barriers. However, it also worth noting the overall decline in the freedom of movements of both goods and assets. 
We can also see no real trend in the convergence of freedom, the standard deviation of some of the 
component indices is falling monetary and fiscal policy, whereas regulation seems to be diverging. The 
overall index displays no discernable trend. 
Looking at Table 1, we see that there are some overall trends, US trade with the rest of the world 
(ROW), has, on average, been rising, despite the short down turn after 9-11-2001. On the other hand, 
average real GDP has fallen, though this may have to do with the inclusion of new countries, which tend to 
                                                                          
6 Also see de Haan and Sturm (2000), and Heckelman (2002). 
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be lower income, e.g. Vietnam and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, continued liberalization of trade restrictions 
and the realization of has led to increasing levels of trade Distance changes are due to the inclusion of new 
countries, a changing composition of countries, and tectonic plate activity. 
From Table 2 we can see that, we do see positive relationships between output, freedom, and the 
three trade variables. Also, as expected, distance is negatively correlated to all the variables. Figures 2a-c 
plot the log of the three trade variables to the log of freedom for the whole period, the line is the estimated 
bivariate relationship. As can be easily seen, the scatter plots show a clear upward relationship between 
each of these indices and exports and imports. Moreover, exports and imports respond differently to 
economic freedom. Specifically, the scatter plot for U.S. exports is more widely distributed compared to the 
plot for U.S. imports. Table 3 shows the sample correlations for the seven freedom indices. As can be seen, 
correlations are rarely above 0.7, and a couple are negative. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
  
  I begin with a gravity model which includes all the freedom indices, but  not the overall index, i.e.  
 ,''= 543210 εββββββ ++++++ lkiiii efwiefwipopydistv  (4) 
where all the variables are defined as before and  
 )5,5,4,43,2,1,(= ′bAreaaAreaaAreaaAreaAreaAreaAreaefwi  
is the freedom vector. This allows us to analyze the conditional impacts of each of the areas. The vector 
lkefwi  captures each of the 21 interaction terms of Areas  k ≠ l , k = 1,K ,5a; l = 2,K ,5b . 
Results of the pooled OLS model above are presented in Table 4, time dummies have not been 
tabulated. Estimated coefficients and their White adjusted −p values are presented. First we note the 
standard gravity variables, real GDP and distance, are close to the literature standard, and are statistically 
significant. The OECD  dummy is significant and negative, evidence, perhaps, of trade diversion over the 
period, while the NAFTA  dummy is positive but insignificant. 
Turning our attention to the freedom variables we see Areas 2, 4a, and to a lesser extent, 5a are the 
relevant variables. However, Area 2, legal system and property rights is strongly negative. Area 4a, the 
freedom to trade, is significantly positive. With respect to the interaction terms, we see most are not 
significant, with the exception of those Area 4a, 4b, freedom of asset movements, and 5b, regulation. 
Moreover, we see  
 0.<440,<53 22 bAaAvbAAv ∂∂∂∂∂∂  
and each are statistically significant at the 1% level, or close to it. 
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4.1. Results of the Pooled OLS regressions 
 
 Next we consider the different Areas in isolation. Results of the pooled regressions with time 
dummies can be found in Tables 5 -- 7, though the time dummy results are not tabulated for to keep clutter 
to reduce clutter.7 Each Model reports two specifications: the first is an unrestricted model, `Model A', the 
second restricts the parameter on economic freedom to zero, `Model B'. −p values for the −F tests of 
0=4β  and whether or not each freedom component can be treated as the overall index, Oi 44 = ββ , are also 
presented. Heteroskedastic consistent −p values are reported in parentheses. Adjusted 2R  for each 
regression specification is also reported. 
First, we note that, like in most gravity models, the model displays a good fit. Also, most of the 
estimates are significant at the 5% level or better. This is contrast with the results in Depken and Sonora 
(2005) who find that while the gravity model does a good job of estimating total volume and export trade 
flows, it is less successful with imports. 
A cursory glance at the results reveals that the estimated coefficients for the “standard” regressors, 
real GDP and distance, all fall comfortably within the range found in the literature. Before specifically 
discussing the freedom estimates, it is interesting to note that the OECD  dummy yields a statistically 
significant negative estimate 0.8)1.5,( −−∈  across the board with the largest effect on imports from OECD  
countries. This is consistent with the US shifting its final consumer goods trade away away from similar 
countries, though the time frame might be too short to capture the trade dynamics over the product cycles. 
On the other hand, the NAFTA  dummy is positive. In this case, the coefficient for NAFTA imports 
is generally greater than for exports. Most likely this is due to the presence of Mexican tariffs on US 
imports, which are scheduled to be phased out on virtually all agricultural imports by the end of 2008. 
Next, we turn our attention to the estimates of the various economic freedom indicators. At first 
glance, it is easy to see that there is considerable variation in the size of the elasticities of the trade values to 
economic freedom. With one exception, all the estimates are positively correlated as predicted, and highly 
significant. We see the overall index elasticities of freedom, 4β , to be between 1.6 and 2.5, the largest of 
any of the coefficient estimates. 
Interestingly, the only indicator of freedom which is negative, though not necessarily statistically 
significant, is the indicator for `Legal Systems and Property Rights',  Area 2, which has the implication that 
countries with strong interest groups may be able to manipulate the system to their benefit, e.g. French 
farmers. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, `Sound Money',  Area 3, does not have much of an large impact on total 
volume or imports, but does with exports, presumably because countries with relatively high degrees of 
monetary autonomy closely correspond to countries which have more liberal trade, see Table 3. 
                                                                          
7 Results are available from the author on request. 
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Not surprisingly `Freedom to Trade',  Area 4a, has a larger impact on trade flows than `Freedom of 
Capital Movements',  Area 4b, by roughly a factor of four, and both are statistically significant. 
Next, consider the test statistics for 0=ˆ4β  and Oi 44 ˆ=ˆ ββ . The results show that the indicator 
which is most closely correlated to the overall index is `Freedom to Trade'. The data always rejects 0=ˆ4β  
but never rejects the Oi 44 ˆ=ˆ ββ  restriction. And closer inspection of the results shows that estimates are 
similar, again intuitively appealing as the biggest impact on trade flows  should be overall trade policy. 
Table 8 presents the the −p values for restricting the estimated coefficients for Real GDP, 
Distance, and the Overall Economic Freedom Index equal to each other from each of the three dependent 
variables: In the top third considers symmetric responses for Distance, jiji ≠,= 11 ββ , Real GDP, 
jiji ≠,= 22 ββ , and the Freedom Index, jiji ≠,= 44 ββ , =, ji  total volume, exports, imports. As can be 
see, with the exception of restricting the distance estimate on imports and total volume, the data does 
demonstrate considerable differences in the treatment of the exogenous variables vis-á-vis distance, real 
GDP, and the Freedom Index, we can infer asymmetries do exist, particularly if we think of the total 
volume as a restricted version of the overall model. 
 
 
4.2. Results of the “Dynamic” Regression 
 
 Estimates from the dynamic version, using a SUR model, of the gravity model are given in Table 9. 
A simple two variable scatter plot of the five year growth of trade to the five year change in the EWFI, 
Figure 4, shows a slight, negative relationship. For these tests I only consider the overall index. For each of 
the five changes in the variables, in the first column the notation itti xxx −−∆ =  is used, thus 11 = −−∆ tt xxx . 
Note that the regressors are not differenced form, with the exception of distance. Estimated coefficients, 
their −p values, and an F  test of 0=ewfi∆  is given. 
What is most notable, is which independent variables become significant over each time frame. 
Thus, we notice that over shorter growth periods, one to two years, distance and population seem to play a 
relatively large role, with three years of growth, economic freedom becomes statistically significant 
suggesting that population growth or business cycle fluctuations, influence short term trading patterns, but 
institutional/real changes to the economic structure, freedom, have longer impacts. 
Additionally, freedom falls out of favor over the longer periods with respect to imports. Indeed, 
longer term changes in freedom have a  negative impact on imports in for 3x∆  and on, though not 
significant. Also, freedom negatively impacts exports and the total volume over two year growth periods. 
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What is also striking is the impact countries get from improving their freedom over the longer 
periods. Generally speaking, the elasticities of freedom are substantially greater than those for real GDP 
growth and, with the exception of two year growth, population. 
 
 
4.3. Ordered Probit Regression 
 
 To investigate the effects of changes in output, population and economic freedom on the 
probability that trade flows will increase. Under the assumption that errors are standard normal consider the 
following model:  
                            ,51,=;'= ,, Kkzefi kttktktt εγβαθ +∆+∆+ −−−                                (5) 




























βˆ , the estimated coefficient of most interest, and,  ex ante, should be positive, a higher index increases the 
probability of further trade; kttv −∆ ,  is the average growth of the trade variables, and is expected to be larger 
as we extend the time of the lag; ),,,,(= ′NAFTAOECDdistpoprgdpz  is a vector of country characteristics as 
define in equation ((2)), γ  is a vector of characteristic coefficients and  ε ~ (0,1). As before, changes in any 
of the explanatory variables may take time to “bleed” into invigorated trade, so we define the growth in any 
variable x  to be defined over ,51,= Kk  lags: kttt xxx −−∆ = . 
Results of the ordered probit model can be found in Table 11. Unfortunately, the estimated 
coefficients from probit are difficult to interpret, though they have a similar explanation or a binary OLS 
model's estimated coefficients, which are understood as a probabilities. Essentially, the probit model 
defines the dependent variable θ  as given by  
 ))()1((ln= TradePTradeP −θ  
where )(TradeP  is the probability of increased trade. Thus we can only concentrate on estimated signs and 
the size of the coefficients. 
What is striking is how the significance of the independent variables change as we extend the 
length of time. Over the short term, two years or less, real GDP is the only variable which is statistically 
significant. However, once we lengthen years the lag of growth, the freedom coefficients become more 
important, particularly for exports. We also note that the magnitudue of the freedom coefficients relative to 
the other variables as we increase the lag, implying a greater probability for increase trade flows as the 
result of more freedom. This result has the intuitively attractive result that in the shorter term, trade increase 
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simply due to increases in incomes, but over the longer term improvements in welfare are due to changes in 
the economic structure of an economy. 
The results suggest that economies which experience rapid short term growth will have a larger 
probability of increased trade volume. But, if this growth is not accompanied by longer term changes in 
freedom, any increases achieved by economic growth cannot sustain increased trade flows. Put another 
way, to ensure the probability of robust medium term trade growth a country must implement institutional 
changes which impact freedom. 
For countries which have experienced rapid GDP growth and commensurate trade growth without 
implementing other reforms, such as China which EFI is below the mean, the analysis indicates that to 
enjoy longer term expansion, changes in policy to ensure greater freedom be put in place. 
Given the length of the data, we cannot make inference the time frame required to fully enjoy the 
fruits of the policy changes, but the current analysis suggests that even the relatively short time span of six 





 This paper examines the impacts of economic freedom within the context of a standard gravity 
model. Using a single country model, the gravity model can also investigate the asymmetries of trade 
between the United States and her trading partners. It is clear from the estimates that if the gains to the 
United States are any indication, and given that the US accounts for about about 12% of merchandise and 
13% of services trade, we can imagine what the scope of welfare improvement would be should we conduct 
similar studies on world trade. 
The results also suggest that even if countries concentrate on one of the areas of freedom they can 
enjoy an increase in their overall welfare through the expansion of trade. However, it does depend on which 
of the freedom indicators a country chooses to concentrate one. 
While economic improvement of the masses may come at the detriment of those who hold political 
power and those who benefit from the rents generated by less economic freedom, the methods by which 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  
Year  Variable   N   Mean   Mean∆%    St. Dev.  
 2000-2005 Distance   749   8.524   0.37%   0.479  
 Imports   749   --0.449   7.66%   2.855  
 Exports   749   --0.555   4.91%   2.469  
 Total Volume   749   0.375   11.65%   2.447  
 Real GDP   749   3.293   --1.71%   2.025  
 Population   748   16.152   0.16%   1.663  
 2000 Distance   120   8.510   --   0.484  
 Imports   120   --0.396   --   2.793  
 Exports   120   --0.593   --   2.531  
 Total Volume   120   0.337   --   2.542  
 Real GDP   120   3.280   --   2.039  
 Population   120   16.117   --   1.682  
 2001 Distance   120   8.515   0.06%   0.487  
 Imports   120   --0.389   --1.89%   2.790  
 Exports   120   --0.556   --6.44%   2.426  
 Total Volume   120   0.387   13.75%   2.433  
 Real GDP   120   3.306   0.80%   2.033  
 Population   120  16.151   0.21%   1.682  
 2002 Distance   121   8.518   0.03%   0.486  
 Imports   121   --0.487   22.62%   2.924  
 Exports   121   --0.652   15.96%   2.408  
 Total Volume   121   0.303   --24.66%   2.471  
 Real GDP   121   3.322   0.48%   2.027  
 Population   121   16.175   0.14%   1.675  
 2003 Distance   124   8.525   0.09%   0.484  
 Imports   124   --0.645   27.96%   2.401  
 Exports   124   --0.369   --56.96%   2.770  
 Total Volume   124   0.353   15.48%   2.449  
 Real GDP   124   3.320   --0.07%   2.023  
 Population   124   16.175   0.00%   1.667  
 2004 Distance   127   8.530   0.05%   0.479  
 Imports   127   --0.351   --60.86%   3.215  
 Exports   127   --0.532   36.66%   2.323  
 Total Volume   127   0.484   31.48%   2.360  
 Real GDP   127   3.315   --0.16%   2.032  
 Population   127   16.150   --0.16%   1.675  
 2005 Distance   137   8.541   0.14%   0.467  
 Imports   137   --0.428   19.82%   2.969  
 Exports   137   --0.623   15.68%   2.384  
 Total Volume   137   0.379   --24.41%   2.472  
 Real GDP   137   3.224   --2.77%   2.036  
 Population   137   16.143   --0.05%   1.636  
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Table 2. Sample Correlations 
   
     RGDP    Exports   Imports   Total 
Volume  
 Distance   EWFI   
 RGDP    1.000            
Exports   0.857 ***    1.000          
Imports   0.826 ***    0.867 ***    1.000        
Total   0.876 ***    0.962 ***    0.953 ***    1.000      
Distance   -0.033   -0.291 ***    -0.211 ***    -0.245 ***    1.000    
EWFI    0.415 ***    0.512 ***    0.465 ***    0.475 ***    -0.176 ***    1.000  
   




Table 3. Economic Freedom Correlations 
  
     Area 1   Area 2   Area 3   Area 4a   Area 4b   Area 5a   Area 5b  
 Area 1   1.000              
Area 2  -0.153 ***    1.000            
Area 3   0.109 ***    0.452 ***    1.000          
Area 4a   0.106 ***    0.333 ***    0.457 ***    1.000        
Area 4b   0.059   0.532 ***    0.548 ***    0.646 ***    1.000      
Area 5a   -0.071 *    0.762 ***    0.467 ***    0.409 ***    0.535 ***    1.000    
Area 5b   0.119 ***    0.548 ***    0.441 ***    0.307 ***    0.429 ***    0.726 ***    1.000  
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Table 4. Unrestricted Pooled OLS Results 
 
     TV   −P value   Exports   −P value   Imports   −P value  
 Cons    -9.152   0.241   -3.229   0.680   -9.772   0.361  
rgdp    1.042 ***    0.000   1.022 ***    0.000   1.149 ***    0.000  
dist    -0.968 ***    0.000   -1.159 ***    0.000   -0.896 ***    0.000  
pop    -0.013   0.816   0.032   0.575   -0.069   0.329  
1Area    -3.269   0.358   -4.011   0.297   -2.063   0.651  
2Area    -12.735 ***    0.000   -10.606 ***    0.000   -10.648 ***    0.006  
3Area    3.745   0.196   3.913   0.164   -0.643   0.863  
aArea4    7.108 ***    0.001   5.750 **    0.014   10.241 ***    0.002  
bArea4    -0.928   0.828   -5.925   0.173   -0.944   0.871  
aArea5    8.026 *    0.058   6.734   0.161   11.586 **    0.047  
bArea5    10.187   0.112   9.380   0.178   5.538   0.536  
OECD    -0.734 ***    0.000   -0.726 ***    0.000   -0.857 ***    0.000  
NAFTA    0.301   0.138   0.161   0.522   0.384   0.136  
 12A    0.342   0.647   0.134   0.881   0.274   0.751  
13A    0.856   0.290   -0.254   0.763   1.128   0.263  
aA14    -1.829 ***    0.001   -1.109 *    0.077   -1.947 ***    0.004  
bA14    1.832   0.319   3.192   0.124   1.929   0.411  
aA15    -1.362   0.200   0.210   0.853   -1.655   0.233  
bA15    2.173   0.252   0.437   0.841   1.431   0.515  
23A    1.453   0.180   -0.215   0.856   1.795   0.206  
aA24    0.032   0.923   -0.265   0.553   0.110   0.799  
bA24    1.174   0.254   2.496 *    0.055   1.430   0.299  
aA25    0.964   0.109   1.187   0.058   1.281   0.127  
bA25    2.688 **    0.029   2.392 *    0.079   0.479   0.796  
aA34    -0.895   0.273   -0.086   0.915   -1.866 *    0.080  
bA34    3.777 ***    0.002   3.568 ***    0.005   5.108 ***    0.002  
aA35    0.155   0.909   -0.232   0.868   -0.264   0.884  
bA35    -7.988 ***    0.000   -5.392 ***    0.007   -6.398 **    0.012  
baA 44    -3.354 ***    0.000   -2.546 **    0.016   -4.701 ***    0.001  
aaA 54    0.494   0.441   0.365   0.628   0.563   0.526  
baA 54    1.756   0.119   0.484   0.693   2.519 *    0.097  
abA 54    -1.740   0.399   -2.562   0.277   -4.263   0.136  
bbA 54    0.017   0.995   0.198   0.955   1.992   0.647  
baA 55    -2.709   0.151   -2.184   0.288   -1.619   0.512  
2R    0.879     0.861     0.827    
Notes: Time dummies suppressed;  ***  ,  **  , and  *  represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively using White heteroskedastic corrected errors. ,,,52,=,51,=, lKlKl ≠mbamAm  where m and   l  index the 
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Table 5. Freedom Index Area Results: Total Volume 
  
 Overall-A  Overall-B   Area 1-A  Area 1-B  Area 2-A  Area 2-B   Area 3-A   Area 3-B 
 Cons    3.780 ***    8.150 ***   6.280 ***   8.150 ***   9.010 ***   8.150 ***    8.130 ***    8.150 ***  
  (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
rgdp    1.140 ***    1.240 ***   1.230 ***   1.240 ***   1.300 ***    1.240 ***    1.240 ***    1.240 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
dist    -0.997 ***   -0.976 ***   -0.940 ***  -0.976 ***   0.922 ***   -0.976 ***   -0.974 ***   -0.976 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
pop    -0.089 **    -0.202 ***    -0.204 ***   -0.202 ***  -0.261 ***  -0.202 ***   -0.200 ***   -0.202 ***  
  (0.025)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
ewfi    1.630 ***    --   0.900 ***   --  --0.325 **   --   0.000   --  
  (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.036)     (0.998)    
OECD   --0.950 ***   -0.905 ***   -0.763 ***  -0.905 ***  -0.865 ***   -0.905 ***    -0.905 ***   -0.905 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
NAFTA    0.795 ***    0.854 ***    0.654 ***   0.854 ***   0.892 ***   0.854 ***   0.857 ***   0.854 ***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
 2AR    0.835   0.830   0.839   0.830   0.831   0.830   0.829   0.830  
0=4β    --   0.000   --   0.000   --   0.036   --   0.998  
Oi 44 = ββ
 
--   --   --   0.057   --   0.006   --   0.006  
N    748   748   745   748   748   748   746   748  
Notes:  ***  ,  **  , and  *  represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using White 
heteroskedastic corrected errors. Wald statistics are p – values. Overall - Overall Index; Area 1 - Size of Government; Area 2 - 
Legal System/Property Rights; Area 3 - Monetary Policy. 
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Table 6. Freedom Index Area Results: Total Volume (cont.) 
  














 Cons    
6.380 ***  
 
8.150 ***   
 4.080 ***    
8.150 ***  
 
5.490 ***  
 
8.150 ***   
 
3.430 ***   
 
8.150 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)  
rgdp    
1.170 ***  
 
1.240 ***   
 1.120 ***   
1.240 ***  
 
1.150 ***  
 
1.240 ***   
 
1.170 ***   
 
1.240 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
dist    -
0.958 ***  
-
0.976 ***   
-0.997 ***  -
0.976 ***  
-
0.850 ***  
-
0.976 ***   
-
1.020 ***   
-
0.976 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
pop    -
0.112 ***  
 -
0.202 ***   
 -0.099 ***   -
0.202 ***  
 -
0.106 **   
 -
0.202 ***   
 -
0.077 **   
-
0.202 ***  
  (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.000)   (0.020)   (0.000)   (0.038)   (0.000)  
ewfi    
0.298 ***  
 --   1.610 ***    --   0.202   --   
1.780 ***   
 --  
  (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.451)     (0.000)    
OECD    -
0.939 ***  
-
0.905 ***   
 -0.937 ***   -
0.905 ***  
 -
0.861 ***  
 -
0.905 ***   
 -
0.992 ***   
 -
0.905 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
NAFTA    
0.866 ***  
 
0.854 ***   
 0.841 ***    
0.854 ***  
 
1.030 ***  
 
0.854 ***   
 
0.697 ***   
 
0.854 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.005)   (0.000)  
2
AR    0.846   0.830   0.842   0.830   0.820   0.830   0.837   0.830 
0=4β    --   0.000   --   0.000   --   0.451   --   0.000  
Oi 44 = ββ    --   0.010   --   0.696   --   0.015   --   0.127  
N    669   748   747   748   587   748   748   748  
Notes:  ***  ,  **  , and  *  represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using White 
heteroskedastic corrected errors. Wald statistics are p – values. Area 4a - International Trade; Area 4b - International Capital 
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 Cons    2.810 **    9.620 ***    7.290 ***   9.620 ***   9.830 ***  9.620 ***  8.190 ***    9.620 ***  
  (0.018)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
rgdp    1.070 
***   
 1.240 ***   1.220 ***   1.240 ***   1.250 ***   1.240 ***    1.210 ***    1.240 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
dist   -1.250 
***   
 -
1.220 ***   
-
1.170 ***  
-
1.220 ***  
-
1.200 ***  
-
1.220 ***  
-
1.210 ***   
-
1.220 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
pop    -0.050   -
0.227 ***   
-
0.231 ***  
-
0.227 ***  
-
0.241 ***  
-
0.227 ***  
-
0.197 ***   
-
0.227 ***  
  (0.205)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
ewfi    2.550 
***   
 --   1.110 ***   --   -0.080   --   0.461 **    --  
  (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.602)     (0.013)    
OECD   -0.908 
***   
 -
0.838 ***   
-
0.669 ***  
-
0.838 ***  
-
0.828 ***  
-
0.838 ***  
-
0.868 ***   
-
0.838 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
NAFTA    0.533 **    0.624 
***   
 0.387 *  0.624 ***  0.634 ***  0.624 ***   0.659 ***   0.624 ***  
  (0.047)   (0.007)   (0.057)   (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.007)  
 2AR    0.831   0.817   0.829   0.817   0.817   0.817   0.818   0.817  
0=4β    --   0.000   --   0.000   --   0.602   --   0.013  
Oi 44 = ββ   --   --   --   0.160   --   0.035   --   0.030  
N    748   748   745   748   748   748   746   748  
Notes:  ***  ,  **  , and  *  represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using White 
heteroskedastic corrected errors. Wald statistics are p – values. Overall -- Overall Index; Area 1 -- Size of Government; Area 2 -- 
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Table 7. Freedom Index Area Results: Exports (cont.) 
  
    Area 4a-
A  










Cons    7.450 ***    9.620 ***    5.190 ***   9.620 ***   5.240 ***   9.620 ***    3.370 ***    9.620 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.000)  
rgdp    1.170 ***    1.240 ***    1.100 ***   1.240 ***   1.110 ***   1.240 ***    1.140 ***    1.240 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
dist    -1.140 ***    -1.220 ***    -1.240 ***   -1.220 ***   -1.080 ***   -1.220 ***    -1.270 ***    -1.220 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
pop    -0.150 ***    -0.227 ***    -0.115 ***   -0.227 ***   -0.079 *    -0.227 ***    -0.061   -0.227 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.091)   (0.000)   (0.113)   (0.000)  
ewfi    0.348 ***    --   1.760 ***   --   0.747 ***   --   2.350 ***   --  
  (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.003)     (0.000)    
OECD    -0.921 ***    -0.838 ***    -0.875 ***   -0.838 ***   -0.863 ***   -0.838 ***    -0.953 ***    -0.838 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
NAFTA    0.750 ***    0.624 ***    0.607 ***   0.624 ***   0.819 ***   0.624 ***    0.417   0.624 ***  
  (0.001)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)   (0.007)   (0.156)   (0.007)  
2
AR    0.836   0.817   0.832   0.817   0.809   0.817   0.830   0.817  
0=4β    --   0.000   --   0.000   --   0.003   --   0.000  
Oi 44 = ββ    --   0.047   --   0.976   --   0.050   --   0.222  
N    669   748   747   748   587   748   748   748  
Notes:  ***  ,  **  , and  *  represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using White 
heteroskedastic corrected errors. Wald statistics are p – values. Area 4a - International Trade; Area 4b - International Capital 
Movements; Area 5a - Regulation; Area 5b - Business Regulation. 
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Table 8. Freedom Index Area Results: Imports 
  
  Overall-A   Overall-B   Area 1-A  Area 1-B  Area 2-A  Area 2-B   Area 3-A   Area 3-B 
Cons    1.660   7.540 ***    5.910 ***   7.540 ***   8.180 ***   7.540 ***    7.170 ***    7.540 ***  
  (0.421)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
rgdp    1.250 ***    1.400 ***    1.380 ***   1.400 ***   1.440 ***   1.400 ***    1.390 ***    1.400 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
dist    -0.958 ***    -0.931 ***    -
0.906 ***   
 -
0.931 ***   
 -
0.890 ***   
 -
0.931 ***   
 -
0.930 ***   
 -
0.931 ***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
pop    -0.114 *    -0.267 ***    -
0.265 ***   
 -
0.267 ***   
 -
0.311 ***   
-0.267 ***   -0.260 ***   -0.267 ***  
  (0.062)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
ewfi    2.200 **    --   0.810 ***   --   -0.242   --   0.125   --  
  (0.017)     (0.000)     (0.365)     (0.751)    
OECD    -1.110 ***    -1.050 ***    -
0.912 ***   
-1.050 ***  -1.020 ***  -1.050 ***   -1.060 ***   -1.050 ***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
NAFTA    0.778 ***    0.857 ***    0.669 ***   0.857 ***   0.886 ***   0.857 ***    0.863 ***    0.857 ***  
  (0.005)   (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
2
AR    0.738   0.731   0.737   0.731   0.731   0.731   0.730   0.731  
0=4β    --   0.017   --   0.000   --   0.365   --   0.751  
Oi 44 = ββ    --   --   --   0.876   --   0.312   --   0.320  
N    748   748   745   748   748   748   746   748  
Notes:  ***  ,  **  , and  *  represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using White 
heteroskedastic corrected errors. Wald statistics are p – values. Overall - Overall Index; Area 1 - Size of Government; Area 2 - 
Legal System/Property Rights; Area 3 - Monetary Policy. 
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Table 8. Freedom Index Area Results: Imports (cont.) 
  
    Area 4a-A  Area 4a-B  Area 4b-A Area 4b-B Area 5a-A Area 5a-B  Area 5b-A  Area 5b-B 
 Cons    5.110***   7.540***   0.538   7.540***  5.060***  7.540***   2.590*   7.540*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.778)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.074)   (0.000)  
rgdp    1.280***   1.400***   1.190***  1.400***  1.270***  1.400***   1.330***   1.400*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
















  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  










 -0.136**   -
0.267***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.100)   (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.013)   (0.000)  
ewfi    0.326***   --   2.770***  --   0.004   --   1.860***   --  
  (0.002)     (0.003)     (0.989)     (0.000)    
















  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
NAFTA    0.921***   0.857***   0.835***  0.857***  1.100***  0.857***   0.693**   0.857*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.016)   (0.000)  
 2AR    0.794   0.731   0.758   0.731   0.767   0.731   0.737   0.731  
0=4β    --   0.002   --   0.003   --   0.989   --   0.000  
Oi 44 = ββ   --   0.391   --   0.166   --   0.376   --   0.977  
N    669   748   747   748   587   748   748   748  
Notes:  ***  ,  **  , and  *  represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using White 
heteroskedastic corrected errors. Wald statistics are p – values. Area 4a - International Trade; Area 4b - International Capital 




Table 9. Asymmetric Restriction Tests 
 
 Total Volume Exports 
 Distance, 1βˆ  
Total Volume --  
Exports 0.000 -- 
Imports 0.629 0.020 
 Real GDP, 2βˆ  
Total Volume --  
Exports 0.004 -- 
Imports 0.000 0.000 
 Economic Freedom, 4βˆ  
Total Volume --  
Exports 0.000 -- 
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Table 10. SUR Estimates of Trade Growth, Eq. (3) 
 
       Exports   p-value  Imports   p-value  Total   p-value 
1x∆    Cons    0.597   0.147   -1.755   0.392   0.531   0.380  
  dist    -0.061   0.200   0.214   0.371   -0.057   0.417  
  rgdp    0.043   0.953   6.735 **    0.024   0.852   0.376  
  pop    0.474   0.825   -11.286   0.273   0.186   0.953  
  ewfi    0.641   0.243   -1.826   0.413   -0.158   0.811  
  OECD    -0.015   0.786   -0.156   0.578   -0.025   0.763  
  NAFTA    -0.123   0.496   0.434   0.631   -0.061   0.819  
  F    1.370   0.243   0.670   0.413   0.060   0.811  
2x∆    Cons    5.268 **    0.011   -4.309   0.066   0.780   0.437  
  dist    -0.640 ***    0.009   0.593 **    0.031   -0.071   0.549  
  rgdp    0.074   0.970   -0.616   0.736   0.896   0.112  
  pop    15.468 ***    0.005   -14.142 **   0.019   1.361   0.600  
  ewfi    -5.494 **    0.011   4.088 **    0.041   -0.841 *    0.087  
  OECD    -0.138   0.626   -0.019   0.951   -0.071   0.601  
  NAFTA    -0.843   0.357   0.801   0.440   -0.096   0.830  
  F    6.470   0.011   4.190   0.041   2.940   0.087  
 3x∆    Cons    0.463   0.470   1.979   0.307   1.449   0.151  
  dist    -0.023   0.757   -0.220   0.334   -0.147   0.215  
  rgdp    0.294   0.462   1.617 **    0.015   0.925 **    0.021  
  pop    -1.083   0.339   3.220   0.300   0.660   0.703  
  ewfi    1.043 *    0.074   -2.125 **    0.022   0.096   0.847  
  OECD    -0.076   0.383   0.000   0.999   -0.048   0.726  
  NAFTA    -0.110   0.699   -0.383   0.657   -0.306   0.496  
  F    3.200   0.074   5.300   0.022   0.040   0.847  
4x∆    Cons    0.269   0.738   1.786   0.395   1.549   0.153  
  dist    -0.009   0.924   -0.195   0.428   -0.163   0.202  
  rgdp    -0.025   0.951   0.825 **    0.027   0.374   0.277  
  pop    -0.177   0.869   0.732   0.764   0.514   0.709  
  ewfi    1.703 ***    0.001   -0.127   0.695   0.957 **    0.012  
  OECD    -0.102   0.349   0.034   0.903   -0.029   0.843  
  NAFTA    -0.075   0.833   -0.402   0.667   -0.356   0.459  
  F    10.290   0.001   0.150   0.695   6.430   0.012 
5x∆    Cons    -0.059   0.946   1.758   0.394   1.162   0.348  
  dist    0.004   0.966   -0.192   0.426   -0.134   0.358  
  rgdp    0.732   0.059   0.724 **    0.023   1.080 ***    0.002  
  pop    1.546 *    0.092   0.571   0.765   1.379   0.273  
  ewfi    1.354 ***    0.004   -0.032   0.903   0.354   0.339  
  OECD    -0.052   0.656   0.034   0.900   -0.006   0.973  
  NAFTA    -0.168   0.661   -0.392   0.669   -0.350   0.525  
  F    8.540   0.004   0.010   0.903   0.920   0.339  
Notes: ,51,=, Kkxk∆  is the length of the growth period, e.g. 33 = −−∆ tt xxx ;  ***  ,  **  , and  *   represent rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively; F  is the −(1,555)F test of 0=ewfi . 
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Table 11. Ordered Probit Estimates 
 
    Volume   zp >    Exports   zp >    Imports   zp >   
 1θ   dist    -0.178   0.111   0.045   0.694   -0.039   0.736  
 rgdp    6.702 ***    0.000   2.520 *    0.085   5.259 ***    0.001  
 pop    0.399   0.936   2.658   0.597   -2.070   0.685  
 efwi    1.194   0.340   1.481   0.244   1.814   0.159  
 OECD    0.026   0.842   -0.059   0.659   0.041   0.757  
 NAFTA    -0.443   0.308   -0.020   0.965   0.037   0.933  
 2~R      0.022     0.007     0.017  
 )( 2χp     0.000     0.276     0.006 
 2θ   dist    -0.235 **    0.056   -0.020   0.874   -0.080   0.525  
 rgdp    5.822 ***    0.000   2.538 **    0.012   3.443 ***    0.001  
 pop    0.863   0.758   1.900   0.507   -1.469   0.605  
 efwi    0.885   0.414   -0.094   0.932   0.741   0.494  
 OECD    0.063   0.662   0.012   0.937   0.077   0.596  
 NAFTA    -0.594   0.214   -0.139   0.773   -0.165   0.723  
 2~R      0.041     0.009     0.017  
 )( 2χp     0.000     0.232    0.013  
 3θ   dist    -0.384 ***    0.007   0.051   0.718   -0.253   -0.543  
 rgdp    5.411 ***    0.000   1.122   0.180   3.186   1.323  
 pop    0.118   0.959   -2.898   0.187   4.831   0.317  
 efwi    3.199 ***    0.009   3.117 ***    0.005   1.251   -1.080  
 OECD    -0.002   0.991   -0.108   0.510   0.238   -0.102  
 NAFTA    -0.901   0.086   -0.126   0.796   -0.696   -1.754  
 2~R      0.079     0.024     0.031  
 )( 2χp      0.000     0.006     0.002 
 4θ   dist    -0.206   0.228   -0.115   0.512   -0.276   0.110  
 rgdp    2.913 ***    0.001   1.509 *    0.088   2.028 **    0.028  
 pop    1.291   0.535   5.232 **    0.016   -0.363   0.862  
 efwi    3.812 ***    0.001   6.407 ***    0.000   1.252   0.276  
 OECD    -0.074   0.713   -0.160   0.439   0.172   0.403  
 NAFTA    -0.499   0.414   -0.893   0.180   -0.872   0.146  
 2~R      0.067     0.090     0.023  
 )( 2χp      0.000     0.000     0.075 
 5θ   dist    -0.152   0.540   -0.276   0.272   -0.194   0.432  
 rgdp    2.745 ***    0.025   2.696 **    0.029   1.607   0.162  
 pop    1.640   0.507   6.422 ***    0.010   0.504   0.829  
 efwi    4.769 ***    0.002   6.059 ***    0.000   1.766   0.221  
 OECD    -0.071   0.808   -0.010   0.972   0.328   0.259  
 NAFTA    -0.523   0.547   -1.161   0.212   -0.881   0.301  
 2~R      0.097     0.130     0.026  
 )( 2χp      0.001     0.000     0.375 
Notes: |>| zp  is is the −p value;  ***  ,  **  , and  *   represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively; 2
~R  is the pseudo- 2R ; and )( 2χp  is the −p value associated with the normality test. 
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Figure 4. Change in Trade Volume and EWFI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
